Political Mobilization of the Russian Opposition on the Example of Protests in January 2021

Abstract

The paper examines the political mobilization of the Russian opposition using the example of the protests that took place in January 2021. Based on telephone survey data representing the population of Russia (N = 1051), the authors trace the reflection of political mobilization in public opinion. This data is supported with materials of qualitative interviews with the participants of the action on January 21, 2021 in Samara (N = 23), which allows to study the practice of protest mobilization aimed at supporting Alexei Navalny. The results of the study show that, for the first time since 2012, the opposition managed to widely mobilize information resources and raise the level of awareness of the actions to 90%. At the same time, it was rather impossible to win over Russians who were not involved in opposition activity: the level of approval of the protests among the population is 13%, and only every tenth survey participant (9%) expressed a desire to take part in such protest actions. Social networks have become the main channels of protest mobilization. The authors reveal the high level of protest self-organization of the participants in the January actions in Samara; however, most of the participants are able to independently coordinate their actions. Thus, the modern Russian protest movement is characterized by a transition from vertical to horizontal protest mobilization, a striking example of which is the 2020 protest actions in Belarus.