E. L. Omelchenko  

IS THE RUSSIAN CASE OF THE YOUTH CULTURAL PRACTICES TRANSFORMATION UNIQUE OR NOT?

Elena L. OMELENKO — Dr. Sci. (Soc.), Professor, Director of the Centre for Youth Studies  
E-MAIL: omelchenkoe@mail.ru  
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5951-3682

Abstract. The article focused on the experience of studying youth cultural practices and group identities in Russia in the post-soviet era. The attention to 25 years period of the youth cultural space transformation could be explained not only with scientific interest and an attempt

УНИКАЛЕН ЛИ РОССИЙСКИЙ СЛУЧАЙ ТРАНСФОРМАЦИИ МОЛОДЕЖНЫХ КУЛЬТУРНЫХ ПРАКТИК?

ОМЕЛЬЧЕНКО Елена Леонидовна — доктор социологических наук, профессор, директор Центра молодежных исследований, Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики» в Санкт-Петербурге, E-MAIL: omelchenkoe@mail.ru  
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5951-3682

Аннотация. Статья посвящена опыту исследований молодежных культурных практик и групповых идентичностей в России в постсоветское время. Обращение к 25-летнему периоду развития и трансформаций молодежного культурного пространства объясняется

to understand the changes that have occurred in this historical period, but with the fact, that during these years the theoretical and practical findings and work of the Scientific Centre “Region”, Ulyanovsk State University (founded in 1995) and Centre for Youth Studies, Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg (founded in 2009) were developed. The task to include in the frame of one article all our results is ambitious and perhaps could not be complete. That is why we will focus the main attention on the key directions of the transformation of youth cultural practices, on the crucial plots of the direct and mediated influence of global trends as well as local discourses. It is important to understand: did these changes follow the global tendencies (Europe, North America, and Australia) described in the key works of researchers of youth cultures and practices? Or is the Russian case an exception fallen out the ‘classical’ picture? The basis for the analysis is the data from key research projects of our Centers, as well as new theoretical and methodological approaches to the analysis of changing youth sociality in the frame of political and cultural transformations of Russian society.

**Keywords:** youth (sub)cultures, solidarities, youth scene, generation profiles

Starting point.
Together with the youth reality changes, theories and interpretative schemes have changed too. From late 1980sto early 1990s subcultural approach critically rethought [Hall, Jefferson, 1976], a whole body of academic texts, made in the so-called post-subcultural paradigm emerged. The ideas of the authors, inspired by the dramatic
changes in youth cultural landscapes, were a response to the profound changes in the consumer societies of late modern, which led to the emergence of “postmodern subcultures” [Bennett, 1999; Bennett, Kahn-Harris, 2004; Blackman, 2005; Muggleton, 2000; Redhead 1995; Omelchenko, 2011]. For a long time, the discussion between subcultural and postsocial theorists remained out of the focus of domestic researchers. From 2005—2007, the situation began to change: Russian researchers entered into the global academic discourse.

Criticism of the subcultural approach aimed at the exclusive role of the class origin of subcultural identities and at the subcultural choice in the form of symbolic resistance of lads and ladies to parental culture and through it to the dominant culture of society. “Classic” subcultural patterns demanded loyalty to the style and ideology that cemented unity and manifested itself in bodily performances, “special outfit”, slang, cultural sympathies. Postsocial theorists insist on the fluidity, temporality of cultural attachments of young people as a reaction to the significant transformation of postmodern societies. According to them, the affiliation in certain subcultural groups is a random and leisure practice, a mix of a variety of cultural identities, which absorbed popular pop images, on the one hand, and constantly generating these images, on the other hand. Bright ideas from a new wave of youth researchers give rise to the revival of interest in new forms of youth sociality. Along with this, in the focus of the studies stay: youth transit in the context of the structural conditions of adulthood and their connection with youth cultures [Pilkington, Omelchenko et al., 2002; Hodkinson, 2004; Nayak, 2003; MacDonald, Marsh, 2005]; the role of spatial locations, territories and real-time modes affecting the life trajectories and cultural practices of young people [Roberts, Pollock, 2009]; specific features of the study of marginal or peripheral places, groups and practices [Pilkington, Johnson. 2003; Shildrick, Blackman, MacDonald, 2009]; generational differences, new forms of civic participation and involvement, emerging solidarity around value-style confrontations on youth scenes [Omelchenko, Pilkington, 2013; Omelchenko, Sabirova, 2016]. How does this “classic” baggage of post/subcultural discourse correlate with our research experience?

Where to look for uniqueness?

The youth cultural space of modern Russia characterized by mix, conflict and diverse character.

New youth activities formed and developed in the context of abrupt transformations affecting all aspects of life in Russia. Drastic changes during the perestroika period changed into slowdown and stagnation. The boom of nonconformist youth activity altered with demonstrations of the Pro-Kremlin movements participants. The rejection of censorship and democratization of the media replaced by prohibitions of disloyal cultural initiatives and ideological purges. Despite the differences, the new youth activities could combine the ideas and practices of youth sub/counter/cultural revolt with the remnants of ideas and slogans of formal youth associations of the Soviet time. Complete liberation from the “birthmarks” of Soviet sociality, despite the change of generations, has not happened so far. An important role in the regrouping of youth scenes belongs to the state and media discourses together with educational and the propaganda practices to promote the state youth agenda. If we rely on the significant
signs of the time, keeping in mind that any periodization is conditional, and the forms of youth sociality are often mixed, we can distinguish three stages of reformatting of youth cultural scenes over the past 25 years. I will focus your attention on the most striking features of the changes.

Mid 1980s — early 2000s.

The extremely difficult economic situation, the changing of political rhetoric, the Soviet everyday life hardly losing ground, the precipitous decline in the quality of life of some people and the increase in others — these and other changes form an atmosphere of social uncertainty and a value-normative vacuum. An important sign of the period of “perestroika, glasnost and acceleration” was the practical absence of youth policy and state regulation of youth activity, which led to both positive and negative social effects: the clubs at the state club-houses were closed, the Soviet infrastructure of out-of-school education and leisure activities was curtailed, the institution of Soviet educational patronage in schools, institutes and universities was nullified. At the same time, the social and political activity of “nonconformist” youth associations has increased against a sharp decline in both the reputation and the number of members of the Komsomol. The monopoly of the Komsomol and total dependence on the party dictatorship led to the complete alienation of the staff from the youth. The dominance of the formal and bureaucratic style of the organization led to social apathy and involvement of young people in organized events in a formal nature.

Against the weakening state control, emerging grassroots political and cultural initiatives and social movements. There is a real subcultural boom in the capital cities and megapolises. The formation of market relations and the sophistication in the structure of inequalities legitimized the theme of social inequality and class origin: it became not only possible to talk and write about subcultures, but also fashionable. Youth groups that spread on the wave of perestroika called “nonconformist”, this concept was also used by the participants of the youth scene, although the collapse of the Komsomol and radical reforms of the state sphere deprived the nonconformist identity of the original meaning. The search for terms free from political connotations led scientists to the concept of “tusovka”, which used by the youth. “Tusovka” became a noticeable phenomenon in the late 1980s in the Central parts of Russian cities. That was an authentic cultural youth company whose core group identity was an alternative style to the mainstream. These companies distinguished by the localization and collective isolation in their own “circle” [Omelchenko, 2011]. Certain types of subcultures and nonconformist activities existed before perestroika (“Stilyagi” of the 1960s, hippies of 1970s, “KSP” movement), but it was the late 1980s and early 1990s that marked by the boom of nonconformist activity [Semyonova, 1988; Pilkington, 1994; Omelchenko, 2004]. Russian youth began to master cultural youth scenes, using different strategies of inclusion, both “classic” and mix format [Omelchenko, 2013]. In the late 1990s, the first sociological publications about Russian youth “subcultures” appeared [Islamshina, 1997; Kostyushhe, 1999; Omelchenko 2000; Shchepanskaya, 1993], where subcultural identity presented in terms of lifestyle choices rather than class/origin, as was typical of Western discourse [Omelchenko, 2013].
The brightest signs of that time recorded in the results of the joint project “Looking West: reception and rejection of West images among Russian provincial youth” ¹. Analysis of Russian subcultural identities showed that the key marker by which young people determined their cultural orientation was the allocation of ‘progressive’ (sometimes — “advanced”, “alternative”) and “normal” (“ordinary”) youth. We use this type of self-identification to determine the two main cultural strategies that characterize young people in the late 1990s [Omelchenko, 2011].

During the implementation of this project, a series of ethnographic observations carried out in the youth cultural and leisure spaces of Ulyanovsk, Samara and Moscow. During this period in all cities clubs were opened, audiences with special musical preferences appeared, groups of “clubbers” were formed, and they were initiated into the contexts shared by the participants. These places have become part of the city’s cultural infrastructure and tourist routes. In all three cities, the “progressive” were a minority on the youth stage. Most of the young people “hung out” in apartments, in the yard of a house or school, listened to music, participated in sports, music and other events. They called themselves “normal” or “ordinary” youth, which did not mean that they had no cultural activity. Their main difference from “progressive” was the uncertainty of musical and stylistic identity, they were not “subculturing”, but they were not all “Gopnik”. “Gopnik” countered nonconformists and considered themselves the spokesmen of the “moral majority”, their aggressiveness towards nonconformists was a way to maintain local order. At the time of the study, “Gopnik” knew two types of cultural practices: “beat each other” and “push nonconformists”. Some of “Gopnik” joined the accessible forms of popular youth culture (rave), some went into organized crime. The development of market relations has freed up the space of the “black market”, and in this semi-legal economic niche “Gopnik” have grown into new figures on the youth cultural scene: “Bratki” and “brigade members” [Omelchenko, 2011].

Ritual battles have taken place inside progressive (subcultural) groups too. So, for example, rappers directed their aggression towards skinheads and Ravers. Rappers directly associated the movement of the skins with fascism and racism, and considered it anti-Russian. The affinity of rappers to African-American culture of hip-hop gave the conflict a special meaning [Omelchenko, 2011].

In the list of the other progressive cultural forms rap stood among music and dance movements, rooted in hip-hop culture of street dances, typical for New York the scene of the 1970s. This culture of the street attracted young Russians who grew up in the suburbs, with their territorial traditions and “Gopnik” strategies: a rap connected to a strategy of locality, proximity to the street, “cool” masculinity and interest in “alternative” music and style [Omelchenko, 2011].

The fact that rappers and Ravers stood between normal and progressive strategies spoke of the permeability of the border between them. Young people were able to assign cultural forms as a means for the transition from one strategy to another, but the separation of “progressive” youth from “normal” was an important moment of individual-group identity for all, because the symbolic struggle between them waged

¹ The project conducted in 1997—2000 in Ulyanovsk, Samara and Moscow. Executives: Hilary Pilkington and Elena Omelchenko (supported by the “Leverhulme Trust” foundation, UK). There is a book published based on the results of the study “Looking West? Cultural Globalization and Russian Youth Cultures” [Pilkington, Omelchenko E. et al. 2002].
Cultural strategies of “progressive” and “normal” youth reflected social differentiation in access to and participation in “Global”. For example, almost all young people listened to both Russian and Western music, but the latter considered “music for the body” (for dance or as background for doing something else), while the Russian music (rock, bard song, and even pop) considered “music for the soul” [Omelchenko, 2011].

The project, dedicated to the images of the West, was a kind of response to the moral panic about the Americanization of Russian youth consciousness. We tried to understand what kind of everyday practices accompany the real or mythical involvement of young people, whether there is a “blind” adherence to Western patterns and what these patterns are. Finally, how the image of Russia formed in this regard. We found that the West as a whole did not exist in the perception of young people. The most critical to the West were the most involved, less critical, and more enthusiastic were those who built images of the West on films, rumors and vivid pop heroes. The geographical West could be located in North America or Old Europe, as well as in Japan. Its position and size varied with dependence on personal experience, level of education, access to information. Instead of the image of an attractive and alluring West, we found an increase in spontaneous patriotism, a kind of longing for Russia, along with the resentment that youth passes in a country “where everything is wrong”. As a protective system, some attractive image of Russia formed as a specular reflection of what recognized as negative in the West: lifestyle, education, cultural level and personal communications. Informants described these features as deprived of the most important qualities of soulfulness, sincerity, warmth, and openness for a Russian person.

Along with the changes in the cultural landscapes of cities, the general cultural background of the youth space is changing; the same period becomes a kind of cradle for the so-called “Russian rock”. There is an extensive body of both domestic and foreign literature both in the academic and popular format, dedicated to this period of the Russian underground development [Volkov, Guryev 2017].

In the late 1990s, early 2000s domestic rappers arise who try to adopt the problems of the American “black rap”. The confrontation between the rappers and the metal emerging in this space was not so much musical as stylistic. The clothes, knowledge of the history of this or that group or the direction, appearance all had value. Punks were constantly engaged in the stylistic scrum between rappers and metalheads, they speak for one group, then for the other [Gololobov, Pilkihgton, Steinholt, 2014].

During these years, discos with bars and mini-cafes begin to work in the city club-houses.

Their audiences became “ordinary, normal” urban youth. Gradually domestic show business gains momentum, its’ pioneers are the first pop group of “new” format (“Laskovj Maj”, ”Mirazh”, “NaNa”, “Ruki Vverh”, etc.), they characterized by a new sensual, epatage language and straightforward sexualized images. Their audiences, as elsewhere in the world, are teenagers and schoolchildren. Along with

---

the rapid growth of residential urban areas around enterprises and factories youth groups become active, which united deprived and criminalized youth, they focused on aggressive control of their local territories. These communities characterized by rigid Patriarchal masculinity and the cult of physical strength. The members of the groups became for a long enough period a kind of “sanitation” of the cities. They raided the gathering places and hangouts of nonconformists, both psychologically and physically fought “subcultures” protecting their right to the central urban space [Stephenson, 2015]. Studies of that time record the complex processes of reformatting and reconfiguration, penetration and mutual influence of “Gopnik” and nonconformist cultural images, styles and ideas. Several “Gopnik” subcultures like the boneheads, glamorous punks and the Goths, subcultural simulators and the buffer cultures appeared in this period. Subcultural scenes fragment, internal subgroups refuse the names imposed by pop culture. The search for special, authentic identities starts within the classic sub-cultural scenes.

**Cultural residue of the first period**

Birth and public recognition of the subcultural subject directly influenced youth political agenda. Discursive lines of “work with youth” reproducing the late Soviet construct of “youth as a social problem” — subcultural group identity considered as a deviant practice that requires control and regulation. The end of the century marked by the increase in drug use, a wave of overdoses affected young people in many cities of Russia. A number of alarmist reactions directly associated the increasing involvement of young people in drug use with such inclusion in subcultural activities. Our studies of risky forms of youth consumption aimed at overcoming moral panic, which actually closing the possibility of constructive preventive work [Goncharova et al. 2005].

There is an active construction of the Russian youth consumer: replacement/displacement of political and ideological confrontations into cultural. Subcultural capital turns into an economic and consumer resource, into a product promoted and sold, along with others. In the background of strengthening the symbolic/real border between “progressive” (nonconformist, alternative, subcultural) and “normal” (conventional with “Gopnik” as an extreme wing) youth, formed buffer groups, whose members perceive and borrow various cultural elements and meanings, redefining and combining them. Subcultural capital “redistributed” from nonconformists to “Gopnik”, which weakening presence of subcultures on youth scenes. Mixed cultural forms are spreading; the subcultural identity used both by buffer and mainstream groups. “Gopniks” are beginning to displace informal people from youth scenes using their cultural capital.

By the end of the period, xenophobic and homophobic sentiments are widespread in Russian society as a whole, and not only among young people, which reflects the growing inequality of the population in terms of living standards, social status, access to significant resources, and cultural strategies.

---


The new Millennium and new generational practices: the first decade of the XXI century.

The turning point of the 2000s was the financial and economic crisis of 2008. Along with the tragic events at the beginning of the century in the United States (9/11 attacks), the crisis provoked another surge of interest in the generational approach [Edmunds and Turner, 2002: 118; Omelchenko, 2012]. The media name “Millennials” born in the transition from the XX to the XXI century still remains a landmark for the analysis of fundamental changes in youth practices, group identities and forms of socialities [Radaev, 2018].

The reason for serious fears was the events on Manezhnaya square in June 2002, when football fans and “Gopnik” went on a rampage after the defeat of the Russian team in the match between Russia and Japan. The expressions like “uncontrollable aggressive mass”, “absence of moral constraints”, “the danger of mindless youth rebellion” were used. Openly started talking about out-of-control xenophobic and extremist sentiments after the events in Kondopoga in 2006\(^5\). Serious worries caused the growth of skinhead activity throughout the post-Soviet Russia [Pilkington, Omel’chenko, Garifzianova 2010]. A series of color revolutions in the post-Soviet space, one of the active participants of which were youth raised Special concerns. Interest in young people as an electoral resource and a potentially dangerous mass channeled into the development of large-scale projects of youth mobilization together with the design of new programs of Patriotic education and the publication of new textbooks on the history of Russia\(^6\).

The state takes young people into its own hands.

In the dashing 1990s, the attention of politicians to young people weakened, the processes on the youth cultural scenes unfolded spontaneously and outside of special control. Since the beginning of the new Millennium, the situation has changed dramatically. The era of large-scale youth mobilization begins, and the famous “Nashi” project initiated by the presidential administration has become a bright one\(^7\). The idea of mass “street politics” with its provocative and “innovative” format proved to be extremely successful. “Nashi” and their numerous followers (both local, regional mini-copies and all-Russian successors) played an important role in reformatting the youth space. They effectively used the mechanisms of administrative resources developed during the Soviet period, actively promoting the current political agenda. The projects supplemented by programs of patriotic education, by holding mass youth forums and camps (“Seliger”)\(^8\), where activists named “Commissars” prepared for a career of personnel reserve for the new political elite and the revival of Russia. The meaning of the “new youth policy” was not only in countering revolutions. Project participants have received some sort of vaccination of loyalty and patriotism and feel involved in the highest

\(^5\) The mass riots in Kondopoga (August—September 2006) had great resonance in the media, where young people appeared as the main participant of the riots. [Omelchenko, Pilkington 2012].


\(^7\) “Idushchie Vmeste”, the Russian youth movement created in 2000, was the predecessor of mass youth movements: “Nashi”, “Molodaya Gvardiya”, “Mestnye” and others. “Nashi” is The most successful and provocative, openly Pro-Kremlin project of V. Surkov and V. Yakemenko. By the end of the decade, the movement is in crisis and officially closed.

\(^8\) “Seliger” formats continue to be actively used at various regional youth forums, the most popular is the “Territoriya Smysla”, which programs aimed at the top youth activists of various directions. The speakers of the forum are key political, media and cultural figures loyal to the existing government.
levels of government, where they were willing, if necessary, to the quick mobilization and the struggle with the opposition and with “wrong” young people. Support of the state budget and official media, support of mass demonstrations by the militia (police) actually legitimized their rather aggressive performances and provocations. Later Vladislav Surkov called “Nashi” the “jubilant hooligans” then the project officially closed. Former “Commissars” and followers create their groups, which continue to struggle for “moral order” in Russian cities (Hryushi protiv, StopHam, Esh’ rossijskoe, SHCHIT, Lev protiv, Chistyj gorod etc.) ⁹, the movements continue to receive financial assistance and media support, although not on such a scale [Krivonos 2015].

Spontaneous feelings of “offended patriotism” channelized in different forms of publicity: the crisis of confidence in state structures and their agents and a high level of loyalty to the first person (Vladimir Putin); political apathy (week participate in public politics) and willingness to engage, albeit with pragmatic purposes in the aggressive actions of political PR (“Nashi”, “Molodaya Gvardiya”); the love of Russia “in general”, the pride of its greatness and massive rejection of regional identities (excluding the capital city and part of megapolis areas). The “new Russian patriotism” of the end of the decade has many interpretations: from political “patriotism must be made commercially profitable “ to the fight against the enemies of Russia, proclaimed by the Nazi skinheads ¹⁰¹¹.

*The Financial Economic crisis and new variants of generational names*

Global generation from the beginning of the XXI century formed in the conditions of the world financial economic crisis, it was called “generation R” (“R” for “recession”). The crisis united young people from different countries and social positions, giving them a similar perception of the world. However, global involvement and unification of the objective situation did not lead to the unification of effects from the crisis. In Russia, it caused an increase in corruption, the complication of access to higher education, a significant curtailment of the labor market of high salaries and statuses, which caused not only an increase in youth unemployment (which in Russia was less noticeable compared to other European countries), but also new strategies for responding, such as downshifting. Young people of the first post-Soviet generation did not catch empty shelves in shops, food stamps and “sausage” trains to the capital. However, they know the problem of navigation in the available abundance. Shopping becomes a special cultural practice that performs important socializing functions, “traditional” shopping culture complements by new forms of authentic

---

⁹ An interesting sign of the new initiatives was the public rejection of the heritage of “Nashi”. This gesture is important for activists to dissociate themselves from the reputation of the project created from above and operating under the patronage and control of the presidential administration. Currently, the Centre for Youth Studies is involved in an international project, which explores new civil initiatives of young people, including Pro-government ones. The research is carried out within the framework of the HSE fundamental research Program in 2016—2018 and is implemented in partnership with an international project - PROMoting youth Involvement and Social Engagement: Opportunities and challenges for conflicted young people across Europe (Horizon 2020, 2016—2019).


¹¹ Scientific Centre “Region” participated in the joint Russian-British project “National identities in Russia since 1961: traditions and deterritorialization” (Arts and Humanities Research Council, 2007—2010) headed by Professor K. Kelly. The study took place in two cities of Russia (Vorkuta and St. Petersburg) and was devoted to the analysis of group and individual meanings that young people put into the concept of patriotism.
consumption. Youth employment strategies have not been constant, lads and ladies preferred to postpone starting work until they find worthy places in their opinion. The study conducted that time\(^\text{12}\) showed the obvious generational signs: the growth of unemployment (both official and hidden) in the youth labor market, paid education, the complexity in social mobility, the stratification between the youth of the capital (financial vampires) and peripheral (deprived) territories, the strengthening and complication of migration flows\(^\text{13}\).

**New features of consumer profiles and styles**

The industry of childhood is actively developing: health care, legal support, protection of child rights, show industry, children’s tourism. Together with new consumer niches and the “young parents” social group, new types of exclusion and social tensions are emerging. In the background of the state policy promoting models of large young families, there is a growing stratification between those who have and do not have access to resources for growing up: ecology, state patronage (nurseries, kindergartens, doctors, lawyers), education. Social networks of young parents become a resource of solidarity, their civic activity forms around the basic values of children service and education\(^\text{14}\).

Young people were more concerned not with difficulties of parents in providing the family with food, but with maintaining the usual rhythm of leisure: a nightclub, a fitness center, prices for Internet and a mobile phone. A special role in changing cultural youth practices belongs to the broad involvement of young people in social networks, which started to dictate their own rules of communication. Anonymity replaced by individuality, originality, the popularity of self-presentations, photo and video sessions are growing, the practices of sincerity and support, civic participation, protest and alternative ratings are spreading.

Social networks have significantly affected the consumer market. The importance of non-mass products is growing among young people. Constantly changing ways mixed fashionable and unfashionable, mass and unique, formed and conquered belonging and non-belonging\(^\text{15}\). The popularity of free markets, “give away” practices are growing, processing and transformation (second-hand, hand-made, vintage), non-professional consulting and expertise become fashionable, the exchange and sale of expensive brands are spreading. New youth markets forming, where the practice of production and consumption combined — prosumerism and DIY practices\(^\text{16,17}\).

---


\(^{15}\) The crisis has increased the stratification of the youth consumer market into visible and invisible participants. Outside the active zone of consumption are young skilled workers, young mothers, and little resource and excluded groups like rural youth, children from families with migrant history, young people with three NOT: NOT working, NOT studying, NOT included in social programs. [Varshavskaya, 2016].


\(^{17}\) DIY — Do It Yourself — is not just a youth practice. However, in the youth environment, it is endowed with features of symbolism and belonging to the actual direction of activity: getting out of market control, managing consumer needs and forming mass tastes.
Promotion of new consumer media images affects the rapid growth in the sector of commercial subcultural markets (from Gothic styles to Japanese anime), and the emergence of new identities, which actively perceived and played by a part of mainstream youth. Hipster (the hero of post-glamour) becomes a popular figure on youth scenes, and the political trend and media image [Omelchenko, 2014]. Hipsters present themselves as the main users of intellectual spaces (book cafes, bars, alternative, cinema and loft projects) [Novikova 2011].

A significant sign of youth cultural scenes becomes sportization, cities visually become youthful.

The movements, which usually referred to as post-sports, partially perceive the ideas of new Russian patriotism together with nationalist values, such as the popular “Russian Jogging”, “Russian Running”, which use the slogans of Healthy Life Style and “salvation of the Russian nation” [Pilkington, Omelchenko, Perasović 2018]. Widely spread such sports practices as parkour, fight clubs, workout, which based on the confrontation between commercial and natural sports, the refusal to participate in sports corporate events and the Institute of coaches [Zinoviev, 2014].

Urban activism movements from fighters for “moral order” and street protests participants to creative flash mobs and care for the cleanliness of yards and streets begin to unfold [Zhelnina, 2014; Krupets et al., 2017].

Gender modes of youth scenes are beginning to play an increasing role in the nature of communication between different groups. The acceptance or rejection of female and male “normativity/normality” shared by the community becomes meaningful for the solidarity or opposition of different scenes with each other and of separate subgroups within the same scene and subculture. Getting popular experimentation and play with gender (anime), the promotion of new scenarios of sexual freedom (hipsters) and austerities (sXe), the fight for upholding the “proper/standard” masculinity and femininity (goth, emo, skinheads, punks), Pro- and anti-homophobia rhetoric in the symbolic and real confrontation of different solidarity groups actualized [Omelchenko, 2014].

The discursive space is becoming increasingly competitive. In addition to those, who endowed with formal and administrative power, an important role in mobilizing activities around active actors of the Internet-popular bloggers, creators of video clips posted on youtube resources, alternative writers and non-professional newsmakers played by alternative, non-systemic discourses. Expansion of the information space and the growth of highly competent Internet users stimulates the formation of new professions and platforms for political, economic and cultural activities of young people [Omelchenko, 2014].

By the end of the decade, the main vectors of individual youth solidarity radicalization manifested more clearly. Their value anchors become pro-and anti-patriotic, pro — and anti-migrant sentiments, attitudes towards normative or alternative gender modes, acceptance or rejection of monopolistic systems, different interpretations of the ideas of justice and human rights [Omelchenko, 2014].
The end of the first decade — we move on to the concept of solidarity

The obvious changes in the forms of youth sociality of the first decade of the XXI century influenced the change of our research optics and critical rethinking of the usual constructs of group youth identities. Nonconformists, subcultures, club or bar culture, alternative all did not sufficiently reflect new forms of communication for the youth cultural scenes [Omelchenko, 2013]. By the end of the first decade, our research records the emergence of new youth solidarities based on direct or indirect, event or temporary, real or virtual consolidation of different young people around shared values, which at that time become important for self-determination and identification with their own and separation from “others”. These solidarities, on the one hand, deform the authentic subcultural group identity, on the other hand, consolidate different segments of the youth subcultures, the buffer groups and the mainstream.

We do not use the concept of solidarity as a universal or normative one, we use it to recognize the cross-cutting forms of direct or indirect associations, the social meaning of which determined by the characteristics of specific social situations (economic, cultural and political regimes). The solidary approach helps to see communications not only in groups, but also between groups, to describe “buffer” spaces of transition and to come to the key lines of value-cultural tensions in intergroup communications, to focus on the features of sympathies and enmity within the youth space. The intensity of attraction and repulsion allows us to judge the key values and ideas around which the symbolic struggle unfolds. This struggle reflects the search for a group and individual authenticity together with the degree of influence of discursive practices (state, political, media) on sole individuals and group as a whole [Omelchenko, Sabirova, 2016; Omelchenko, 2014; Omelchenko, 2013].

The advantages of using the concept of “youth solidarity” are as follows:

First, this concept helps to see the special types of relationships between the mosaic majority (mainstream) and the independent minority. Cultural production, intellectual reflection or political protest of the experimenting subcultural minority play an important role as a reference for the mainstream majority.

Second, this approach makes it clear that both “subcultural” and mainstream youth cultures and practices are limited by the same social contradictions and inequalities as society as a whole. Youth cultural practices play a central role in building bonds and solidarity that give meaning to young people’s lives [Omelchenko, 2014].

Third, it turns out to be a milder way of describing youth reality, helping to overcome subcultural barriers and allowing to find common significant vectors along which youth groups are located with varying degrees of intensity. A number of value-semantic continuums allow to take into account both polar (rigid) variants of acceptance or rejection of value positions, and peripheral, boundary, diffuse forms [Omelchenko, 2014].

The growth of protests in most European countries at the turn of the first and second decades of the 2000s brought youth research to the current agenda. The popularity of exotic self-presentations, global references takes youth solidarity beyond particular states and national entities. The palette of actual (trend) policies of identities are changing from an ironic and easy-going glamorization of public protests using gender performances (art-group “War”, the Ukrainian movement “Femen” Russian movement “Porvu za Putina”, the outrageous female punk bands) to the national patriotic
oriented new sports movements such as the “Russian Jogging” or “Putin’s Fight club”. An important element of the new youth solidarities is not only the achievement of a positive result of participation in protest counter- and subcultural activities, but also the enjoyment (civil, aesthetic). [Omelchenko, 2015; Omelchenko, 2014].

Thus, within the framework of the study of anarcho solidarity in St. Petersburg, different forms of these moods were found: from cultural symbolic confrontations to active protest actions and speeches [Litvina, Omelchenko, 2013]. New youth movements and solidarities become key factors of development of network interactions and communications, forming political platforms, developing languages of network mobilizations, expanding horizons of consumer practices, defending new solidarity meanings of justice, sincerity and trust [Omelchenko, 2014]. The growing popularity of DIY practices as an alternative to the growth and expansion of the mass consumer industry, include not only the production of clothing and household goods but also music, media, cinema/video and theater industries.

The active involvement of young people in the exploration of the city through sports practices associated with important changes within the cultural scenes themselves, provoked by the widespread use of risky exotics. Studies of that period helped to draw attention to the role of sensual, bodily inclusion in the collective body of “ours”, which stimulates either dense participation or pushes to leave the group. The importance of pleasure associated with the possibility of obtaining a unique individual experience and the acquisition of new skills and competencies. Inclusion in communities either temporary or permanent helps young people to create local and informal spaces of autonomy characterized by a celebration of sociality and hedonism. A sense of community gives meaning to participation by helping to experience alternative subjectivities that focus not only on the cultural and political values shared by the group. We have also recorded the growth of counter-cultural sentiment as a sign of the value gap in public sentiment, indicating the extreme actualization of the concept of social justice, intergroup and intergenerational trust. The space of youth groups focused exclusively on post-material values is expanding. Such counter-cultural, non-/anti-system solidarities, include different protest groups like middle-class youth, representatives of the creative, intellectual sector, IT specialists, active bloggers and networkers who do not necessarily identify with the opposition [Omelchenko, 2014].

Youth issue in modern Russia: the boundary of the first and second decade of the 2000s — to the present time

The current state of the youth cultural space in Russia is multi-layered and difficult to analyze in the chosen direction, the young generation, whose entire life spent in the “Putin” era, enters public spaces. This Russian youth has a key difference from those who grew up in the 1990s and 2000s, because they did not live in Soviet sociality: neither in childhood, nor in adolescence, nor in early youth. However, during this period

18 The research team of Centre for Youth Studies participated in a large-scale international project MYPLACE («Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement»), headed by professor Hilary Pilkington, from Russian side Elena Omelchenko (2011—2015) (within programme European commission FP7). Retrieved from http://www.fp7-myplace.eu/index.php. Within the Russian part of the project three cases were made: “Russian run” (researcher A. Zinoviev), anarcho scene of Saint Petersburg (researcher D. Litvina), youth movement “Nashi” (researchers N. Fedorova, N. Minkova, D. Krivonos), three research movies have been filmed (director D. Omelchenko). Retrieved from https://spb.hse.ru/soc/youth/videos.
Soviet practices of military-patriotic education of senior schoolchildren and adolescents began to revive actively\(^{19}\). However, the older of their cohort had the events of 2011—2012, which could become a generational trauma and gain a foothold as a generational syndrome\(^{20}\): loss of sense of civil security, caution in the open expression of personal opinion, rejection of critical assessments, conformist loyalty. Despite the high level of trust shown to the President of the Russian Federation in the ratings, the meaning of trust has changed. Young people involved in cultural youth scenes begin to move away from the pro-imperial reading of the patriotic agenda actively promoted by media discourse. Despite the public atmosphere around and after the events in Ukraine and the situation with Crimea, there was no full consolidation and solidarity around the active promotion of the “Crimea-is-ours” idea. In almost all youth groups, communities, subcultural and mainstream youth scenes, there were serious conflicts that divided young people into “pros” and “cons”. Already at the beginning of the second decade, the results of a large-scale study allowed us to draw a conclusion about the formation of special generational features (generation of Crimea) with specific characteristics of the syndrome albeit not fully shaped but shared by many\(^{21}\). The Patriotic mood in this period, given multiple interpretations. Young people included in more conservative institutions (for example, military schools) partly share the version promoted by the government with the Central ideas about “the need to protect against enemies”, “the special Russian way”, “readiness for military protection”. However, even in this environment, we may encounter pragmatic interpretations, conformist non-involvement in the discussion, and even creative redefinition of patriotic feelings and symbols\(^{22}\). The interpretations of patriotism of young people, who are tightly involved in different forms of youth cooperation (communities, subcultures, movements, near-political activities), become closer to the private, emotionally colored everyday citizenship of so-called “small affairs”. Young men and women are ready to be included only in those initiatives that find support in the group of “friends”, whose participants they trust, whose values of internal communication they share, they are ready to participate as long as there is a guarantee of change, “benefit” and result albeit potential. The trauma of direct civic participation in 2011—2012 actually closed the road to mass public activity. Actions

\(^{19}\) From the 1st of September, 2016 begins the history of the National Military Patriotic Social Movement Association “Yunarmiya”, aimed at patriotic education of pupils. The movement is a direct successor of the Soviet programs. Within this project, programs are being implemented to prepare children and adolescents for military service, contests and competitions, training camps and rallies are held on the basis of military units. Soldiers of “Yunarmiya” have their own uniform, in 2017 they first marched through Red Square on Victory Day Parade in Moscow. On February 21, 2018, the Army consisted of almost 192.6 thousand people. Retrieved from [http://yunarmy.ru](http://yunarmy.ru).

\(^{20}\) Protests in 2011—2012 ended with severe detentions of activists and oppositionists. At the same time, on different sides of the barricades (in the literal sense of the word) were lads and ladies of one generational cohort, but with opposite political and ideological goals. From one side “Nashi”, from the other side young citizens of the middle class, which journalists later called hipsters and “angry young citizens”.

\(^{21}\) These events became the impetus for a shared generational experience, which continues to influence the current 20—25 years old: difficult experiences of the war, close death, and the risk of the possibility of instant geopolitical changes but also experience a special patriotic boom, the actively promoted in the public discourse. More about it see: E. Omelchenko “About generation of the Crimea, pragmatic patriotism and disappearance is ready”. Retrieved from [https://spb.hse.ru/press/146967207.html](https://spb.hse.ru/press/146967207.html).

\(^{22}\) We are talking about a resonant video recorded by cadets of the Ulyanovsk Institute of Civil Aviation, in which they dance to the song “Satisfaction” in the dormitory of the school. This video was a parody of a video shot in 2013 by British army soldiers. The initial reaction of the Institute administration was to dismiss clip participants, but after a series of videos in the format of a wide flashmob in support of the cadets, they lifted their sanctions.
of a smaller scale in April 2017 confirmed and strengthened the feeling of insecurity and direct risk for those who decided to go out and openly express their opinion. The key issues of criticism are stories related to social injustice and growing inequality in all spheres of life, including the youth environment.

In General, our study recorded a decline in nationalist and anti-immigrant sentiment. We see that the very popular in the early 2000s skinhead movement has gone, gone and “Antifa” movement, which to some extent reproduced each other. Most of all we notice weakening of xenophobic and nation-colored sentiments in the younger youth cohort of 16—19 years, lads and ladies who were least exposed to direct propaganda, because they almost do not watch Russian information analytical TV programs, preferring to receive information from YouTube, Instagram and other network sources. They are more focused on internationalism and less on patriotism in its’ political sense.

A few important strokes in relation to generational profile.

At this time researchers draw their attention to the experience of “Millennials”, the most significant feature of which is their full inclusion in digital communications (digital native), unlike their older peers, who are called digital immigrants. Digital natives are girls and boys, “born with a mobile phone in their hands”, from early childhood mastered exclusively new ways of exploring the world and understanding their own meaning. The nature of intra- and inter-group communication is changing, which signs are the emphasis on the emotional, sensual side of interaction: the expectation of feedback formed in the online space and fixed in the experience, is decisive for building relationships and self-perception. “Private” and “public” intersect and penetrate each other, self-presentation in Instagram chats and other networks become a kind of mandatory addition to the image and the corresponding skills. The reaction, the answer to the question, different forms of the assessment (likes, comments, certificates, medals, entries in school and student portfolios) is an important component of building an identity. Dense network involvement directly affects the choice of communication channels and the level of awareness among young people. An important point is a language and visual content which used, as well as the density of response to network calls by “friendly” environment (milieu, community, party, sub/cultural group).

Interest in new generational practices from recruitment agencies and heads of business structures of all kinds significantly increases during this period, which stimulated by new features that are associated with the labor behavior of Millennials. The emphasis made on the complexities of motivation, the unpredictability of their labor migration plans, excessive demands on the workplace and the atmosphere like the rejection of strict discipline and a clear schedule, the principles of collective responsibility and collective encouragement, the desire to combine routine work with an off-system “fun” and more. Our research also records the lack of rigid binding of young people aged 18—25 to one place and one profession, they tend to combine different types of employment (freelance, distance work, public sector and entrepreneurship), depending not only on material motives, but also the sphere of interests, career ambitions and


plans. We note that modern girls and boys have a bad idea of their future, it is difficult for them to formulate plans on a period more than three to five years.

Dense network involvement of young Millennials affects the nature of their value orientations, the younger cohort groups, the more they tolerant and receptive to differences and exclusivity of various kinds. However, these same groups are more anxious, have a high sense of danger; they are more scrupulous in environmental matters, which can be manifested in relation to their body care, the choice of clothing, food, water, as well as animals and their proper content. Feelings of risk and loss of privacy and security accompany well-developed network practices and strong involvement in online communication. Online space becomes another platform for probable Internet bullying.

Subcultures, solidarity, cultural and youth scene.

Along with the peculiarities of discursive influence on the group, youth identities, segments opposing each other in such conflict dimensions as: (a) formal (organized from above) and informal (grass-roots) involvement in politics as “small affairs policy”, everyday citizenship; (B) gender modes focused on the pursuit of equality and balance of male and female in access and participation, and those focused on supporting patriarchal power relations (in the family, in the community, in the state, etc.); (C) patriotism based on citizenship and patriotism based on nationality, together with the militarization of patriotism.

These tensions have become one of the prerequisites for the moratorium of sub/cultural activity, during this period we begin to notice a significant reduction in (sub)cultural scenes. “Clean” subcultures become protected areas, not having time to develop, they give way to post-subcultures, smoothly dissolving in them and partly in the mainstream [Cecina, Agapova, 2016].

Subcultures in their classic type move to the periphery. We recorded the beginning of this process since the early 2000s, which was due to direct political pressure and the “struggle” with subcultural involvement 25..

Companies are becoming more mixed in age, gender and style. Young people successfully form micro groups around them, consisting of former classmates, group mates, yard friends, relatives, those who have similar hobbies. At the same time, the family and yard companies are more important for the formation of close relations and attachments for the youth of Makhachkala and Ulyanovsk, while the youth of St. Petersburg and Kazan more focused on public meeting spaces. Yard culture is outdated, preserved as separate rare zones in the space of urban localities of the old Soviet type, for example, areas of buildings such as “Khrushchevka”.

The main vectors of youth sociality are urban sports, computer games, and intellectual games in closed, club spaces, practices and communities related to a healthy lifestyle. For young people in all four cities it is important to be active, interpretations of activity are different, they can vary significantly depending on regional, gender, class, ethno-religious meanings. Formal and grassroots (self-organized) involvement, on

25 The project “Creative fields of interethnic interaction and youth cultural scenes of Russian cities” (the project funded by the Russian Science Foundation, Project Number: 15—18—00078). The study conducted in St. Petersburg, Kazan, Makhachkala and Ulyanovsk. We will present the full materials of the study in the forthcoming book “Youth in the city. Russian case: cultures, scenes, solidarity”.

companies are becoming more mixed in age, gender and style. Young people successfully form micro groups around them, consisting of former classmates, group mates, yard friends, relatives, those who have similar hobbies. At the same time, the family and yard companies are more important for the formation of close relations and attachments for the youth of Makhachkala and Ulyanovsk, while the youth of St. Petersburg and Kazan more focused on public meeting spaces. Yard culture is outdated, preserved as separate rare zones in the space of urban localities of the old Soviet type, for example, areas of buildings such as “Khrushchevka”.

The main vectors of youth sociality are urban sports, computer games, and intellectual games in closed, club spaces, practices and communities related to a healthy lifestyle. For young people in all four cities it is important to be active, interpretations of activity are different, they can vary significantly depending on regional, gender, class, ethno-religious meanings. Formal and grassroots (self-organized) involvement, on
the one hand, differ significantly, on the other hand, penetrate into each other, which, for example, demonstrates the ethnography of volunteering in Ulyanovsk or search practices of Kazan students, initiative forms of urban tourism in St. Petersburg. The trend of authenticity (in the context of shared values) inherent in the majority of youth communities as for “the Instagram girlhood”, and for participants of dark scene in St. Petersburg. Different young people (in culture, style, class, and ethnicity) can share some common values — Healthy Life Style, sports, volunteering, fanaticism, computer and board games. The values of civic responsibility, altruism and willingness to care for others shared by respondents in all cities, regardless of group identities and cultural choices. The so-called “traditional” values and patriotic attitude have a noticeable impact on the shared meanings of group identities, which indicates the significant role of political discourses in the reformatting of the space of youth activism and youth cultural scenes. The survey recorded a noticeable presence of various forms of religious activism in Makhachkala, Kazan, Ulyanovsk (in descending order).

It is popular to consider yourself to a follower of a healthy lifestyle. These practices can be implemented through asceticism in consumption (vegans, vegetarians), refusal of smoking and use of psychoactive substances or through virtual healthy lifestyle communities that communicate only in social networks (Vkontakte, Instagram, etc.), but form a certain agenda: what you can eat, how you can lose weight and how to spend the weekend. It is popular to go for sports and be an active fan of it. Young people very often identify themselves and their friends with cyclists, workout fans, and football fans.

In addition, there is sufficient similarity of the key trends of youth sociality in the modern urban environment, the data obtained in the survey show the importance of regional differences. The profiles of St. Petersburg and Kazan on the one hand, Makhachkala and Ulyanovsk, on the other hand, were closer to each other in terms of types of youth involvement. In this similarity/difference, we have developed the idea that cultural and local identities are more important than ethnic or religious differences. Greater influence on the similarity/difference of regional youth profiles can have gender and class basis of youth groups, as well as albeit indirect, but largely socially and economically justified attitude of themselves and their companies to the center (the capital, in our case — St. Petersburg and Kazan) or to the periphery, the province, which was typical for Makhachkala and Ulyanovsk youth.

Mapping of youth groups in all four cities has shown that, despite variations in their representation, the most common practices are the same. At the same time, the key dimensions of solidarity with “friendly” and the formation of intra-group identity remain: the attitude to gender modes (gender equality or patriarchy), the level of religiosity (from absolute acceptance to atheism and agnosticism), the interpretation of the boundaries of sexual choice (sexual freedom or control over sexuality, tolerance for other options of sexual orientation or homophobia).

The lack of an adequate social demand for citizenship pushes some young people not only to resist formal associations, but also to develop grassroots initiative practices of urbanism and local patriotism. For example, within the institutionally organized movements like volunteering and search teams independent initiatives may be formed, the participants of which redefine the formal rules and objectives. New forms of citizenship of “small businesses”, common solidarity initiatives within small
urban localities are developing: home cafes, hairdressers, veterinary clinics, practices of mutual care and support. Individual areas of grassroots civil practice “at the level of the outstretched hand” can be attributed to the organization of alternative urban spaces in which the participants jointly and severally resist the commercialization of consumer markets (massification and anonymization of consumption) through the promotion of new “anti-capitalist” forms. This may include the popularity of new food practices like “conscious”, ecological consumption (vegans, vegetarians, etc.), DIY markets, practices of care for excluded and animals.

The conclusion.

Consideration of the key transformations of the youth space over 25 years helps to understand the role and place of changes in each stage in the formation of special forms of sociality of Russian youth, which makes it possible to consider in detail and fix the uniqueness of the Russian youth experience.

The first period (80—90th years of the last century) became the time of birth and recognition of the cultural minority and subcultural subject as a significant and included actor of social transformations not only within the youth life, but also in society as a whole. The key concepts by which conceptualized the ongoing changes of the time are: subcultures, parties, nonconformists, progressive and normal, factions, “Gopnik”. The choice of a “normal and progressive” cultural strategy by young people is not entirely voluntary, it is largely determined by the parental and local (neighbourly) environment and culture, geography (capital-province, centre-periphery), structural conditions of adulthood (origin/class, gender, ethnicity, religiosity, capacity). Global changes in the social order, extremely weak youth policy, the destruction of the material and economic infrastructure of social support and support of adulthood acts as a socio-economic and political background of fundamental changes in youth sociality, which produces both negative and positive social effects. A separate role in the formation of new forms of group identities belongs to the “images of the West” as a significant “other”, acceptance and resistance to cultural products, which is expressed through different social effects, the formation of “offended” patriotism in particular.

One of the determining factors of the second stage is the state youth party building, patriotic education, counter nonconformist operations, the movement of “Commissars” and their followers. This time marked by the fragmentation of classical subcultures, the expansion of the space of buffer groups, the emergence of cultural mixes, the politization of youth communities. The departure of subcultures on the periphery of urban spaces have started. In order to understand the new dimensions of youth socialities, we are beginning to develop and introduce the concept of “solidarity” into a scientific analysis, which allows us to consider and analyze the key vectors of value unions and confrontations within and between different youth groups. The growing influence of power discourses, which penetrate and influence the types of youth sociality in varying degrees of intensity, becomes more and more significant.

By the end of the third (modern) stage the youth space, together with the broad involvement of young people in various forms of social and cultural participation in society, subcultural groups are even more marginalized and peripheral. Different types of youth groups (protoculture, solidarities, cultural scenes, groups, activist and civic ori-
entation) are important for included participants’ authenticity (through specific gender modes, share the social values and hierarchies that form the borders of communities). The composition of these groups is the most diverse, but they include modified entities (substances) subcultures — the special nature of communication (a shared sense of community: language, humor, cultural affections, bodily identity), and special cultural sensitivity to the detection of “friendlies”. The reactions of different youth groups and solidarities to the pressure of power discourse are extremely diverse: from uncritical acceptance, through processing, to resistance. The key factors in the choice of “own” group and the subsequent inclusion in group values and meanings are the gender mode of companies, the interpretation of citizenship and public “benefit”, the level of religiosity. We record the birth of new forms of citizenship, grassroots practices of citizenship and local patriotism: volunteering and grassroots volunteering search practices, rap battles with a sharp political agenda, city protests, virtual flash mobs, and network mutual aid. This period becomes the time of formation of the civil youth subject. Commercialization of consumer markets and practices to encourage the formation of alternative spaces of resistance against massification and anonymization through anti-capitalist and anti-glamour mood and initiatives, the popularity of conscious consumption, and particular practices of power, the development of the DIY markets, consumer asceticism, practices of care for excluded and animals.

The changing forms of youth sociality are pushing for new ways of conceptualizing youth cultural practices [Omelchenko, Polyakov 2017]. As part of the ongoing projects, we strive to combine different ideas, both old (post/subcultures) and new (“solidarity” and “cultural youth scene”), in the analysis of modern urban youth identities and practices.

Список литературы (References)


Желнина А.А. «Политтусовка» — альтернативное публичное пространство в сфере молодежной политики. Социологические исследования. 2014. № 3. С. 80—88.

Зиновьев А. А. Наш подарок этому миру: анализ специфики насилия в практиках бойцовского клуба Санкт-Петербурга // Этнографическое обозрение. № 1. 2014. С. 33—46.


Костюшев В. В. Молодежные движения и субкультуры Санкт-Петербурга: социологический и антропологический анализ. СПб.: Норма. 1999. (In Russ.)


Омельченко Е. (2000) Youth Cultures and Subcultures. Moscow: IS RUS. (In Russ.)


Омельченко Е. Риски и удовольствия на сценах молодежного активизма современной России // Пугачев М. Г., Филиппов А. Ф. Пути России. Альтернативы общественного развития. 2.0. М.: Новое литературное обозрение. 2015. С. 25—47.


